Abstract--Road pricing is widely advocated as a solution to congestion problems The underlying theory is well developed, and we even have the technology to implement it without toll booths Only political barriers remain Decision makers are reluctant to retrofit tolls on existing highways because they do not know what circumstances might make such an action acceptable to the pubhc This paper develops a graphical model that displays the interaction between road capacity, user demand, travel speed and toll charges The model is then used to analyze the sources of public resistance to road pricing Might the potential response to road pricing be predicted using data from the new toll roads now being built around the United States 9 Our model shows it cannot Pohttcal success depends on the demand characteristics at the right-hand side of the demand curve, while toll road data only trace out the left-hand side of the curve Our model also shows situations where the new toll roads are likely to generate public anger The Appendix discusses an experimental design that uses unobtrusive measures to assess the effect of a transportation project
INTRODUCTION
This paper develops a new way to depict the demand for travel on a prlced road, and then uses this tool to analyze two important questions First, what factors determine whether road pricing wllI be politically acceptable? Second, what might we learn about road pricing from the toil road experiments planned around the United States 9
Is road pricing a feasible method for reducing traffic congestion? Economists argue that road pricing would be an effective way to deal wlth congestion (Small, 1993) , and there is strong empirmal evidence that raising the cost to use some given road segment will actually reduce demand for its use (two good collections of articles are Button, I986, and Small, 1993) . But implementation hinges on a political question: Will It be politically feasible to impose road pricing on existing highways?
It has been proposed to answer the feasibility question by studying public acceptance of the new toll roads that will soon be opened around the U S (Poole, 1993) . These roads seem like a felicitous natural experiment: We can see how drivers respond when they are asked to pay for the privilege of using a highway Unfortunately, thls is not the experiment we need The analysis developed here shows that new toll roads and retrofitting prices on emstmg roads are likely to be perceived by drivers as two fundamentally different situations. Hence, the data derived from a new roadway cannot tell us about the driver responses that would occur if we imposed user charges on an existing roadway. Furthermore, the analysis highlights conditions where the new toll roads, themselves, are likely to generate considerable political problems.
THE DEMAND CURVE IF ROAD PRICING IS IMPOSED
We want to picture the driver's demand for a highway once a user fee is imposed on it. Demand is a function of price and speed--drivers will pay more for a high-speed journey than a congested one. But speed Is related to the number of users. Thus, the demand curve for a priced highway must show the interaction between three factors: the fee (cents per mile), the number of drivers who want to use the highway and the speed. How can we depict such a curve?
Hau (I993) provides a complex representation. The solution developed here is simpler: I define each speed as a separate commodity (e.g. the driver chooses between buying 84 C LAVE a 25-mph trip and a 40-mph trip) Thus, one demand curve shows drivers' demand for travel at 25 mph, another curve shows drivers' demand for travel at 40 mph, etc. F~gure 1 shows the family of demand curves The top curve shows demand for 55-mph travel m some given geographic area" As the user fee drops, more dr~vers want to buy this 55-mph commodity. The curve slopes downward for two reasons. (a) The value of time differs across lndlvlduals; and (b) given the diversity of origins and destinations, some drivers have better alternatives than others. At the right-hand end of the demand curve are drivers w~th low value of t~me, or good alternatlve routes or flembfllty to postpone the trap to another hour. At the left-hand end of the demand curve are drivers with hzgh value of time, or poor alternative routes or mflexable schedules The successzve curves move upward because at any given price, more drivers are interested m using a h~gh-speed road than a low-speed road Conslder the eqmhbrmm on a no-fee highway The horizontal axis of the graph corresponds to a price of zero. At zero price, Q~ number of drivers would want to use this highway if its average speed were 25 mph, but more drivers, Q4, would want to use it if the average speed were 55 mph Now suppose that the physical capacity of this highway zs Qz cars per hour; the equilibrium speed will be 25 mph Suppose we had started wlth fewer than Ql users The absence of congestion permits a speed higher than 25 mph, but that higher speed attracts more dr~vers As more drivers enter the road, average speed falls until it reaches 25 mph at Q, If the capacity of the highway had been Q4, then equlhbrmm would have occurred at an average speed of 55 mph Consider next road pricing. Assume we start with a congested highway Q~ physical capacity and a 25-mph equilibrium Suppose we want to decrease congestmn enough to increase the speed to 40 mph. We look in the h~ghway capacity manual and discover that a reducuon of traffic to Qz cars per hour will produce a 40omph speed. So how do we get (Q~ -Qz) cars to leave the hzghway 9 Drivers are now operating on the 25-mph demand curve; a price of P~ intersects that demand curve at B and lov, ers the quantity demanded to Qz cars-only Q2 cars are wllhng to pay P~ to travel 25 mph Once (Q~ -Q2) cars leave the road, the average speed will increase to 40 mph But at a price of P~ and a speed of 40 mph, demand increases to point C, which, of course, creates enough congestmn to lower speed below 40 mph. In fact then, ~t as the intersectmn of the 40-mph throughput constraint wzth the 40-mph demand curve that we need: A price of Pz reduces demand to Q2. D is the equlhbrlum, not B Likewise, to find the price where traffic flows at 55 mph, we find from the highway capacity manual that we must reduce demand to Q3 cars Then look at the mtersectmn of Q3 with the 55-mph demand curve, point E, to see that a price of P3 will produce the necessary reductmn m vehlcles. Finally, we might construct a composite demand curve that incorporated the threeway relationship between price, usage and speed. It would be the points ADEF (assuming a 55-mph speed hmlt keeps users on the EFporuon of the curve)
1 Welfare analysts of a road under roadpncmg
Consider the consumer welfare ~mphcaUons of road pricing for this particular set of demand curves Wlth no fee, the speed was 25 mph, and the aggregate consumer surplus was the area bounded by points AGO. A fee of/>3 results m an average speed of 55 mph, w~th consumer surplus of EFP3 That is, with this set of demand curves, aggregate consumer surplus m~ght actually fall: Clearly the new area, EFP3, is smaller than the old area, AGO, so the change m consumers surplus depends on how the government uses the new toll revenue, Q3EP30. If the revenue is spent on projects that are valued by the drivers, consumer surplus rises; if the revenue ~s spent on projects that the drivers do not value, consumer surplus falls Figure 2 shows another possible set of demand curves" Some drivers value driving at 55 mph very h~ghly; they have few alternat~ves, httle flex~bfllty or h~gh value of time. Some drivers value dnvmg at 55 mph a medmm amount, and some only a httle For this set of demand curves, road pricing increases aggregate consumer surplus, regardless of what is done with the fees. Area CFP~ is greater than area Q~DO F~gure 3 repeats the demand curves from Will the pubhc accept a user fee that Is imposed on an emstmg highway9 This is the key issue m the whole road-pricing debate. (For two recent treatments, see Gomez-Ibanez, 1992, and Gmhano, 1993 .) It seems reasonable to postulate that acceptance depends on major condmon" The amount of mconvemence to those drivers who are pushed off by the new fees must be qmte low compared to the gain for the drivers who remain. Some road-pricing advocates take this outcome for granted. They argue something hke this. Suppose we now have a very congested highway carrying roughly 2000 cars per lane-hour; we choose a fee sufflclent to push 100 users off the highway; traffic then flows smoothly; 1900 persons gain and only I00 lose; thus the pubhc should be happy But it is not sufficient that the number of losers as small Pohtlcal acceptance also depends on the change m utdlty. If road pricing is to be politically acceptable, we need to satisfy three condmons:
I. The loss in utility to those pushed off is small-perhaps they have good alternatives, and so are qmte wdhng to move 2 The gain m utility of the users as large-perhaps they get a substantial time savings while paying only a small road fee 3 The proportion of losers to garners must be low
The proportion of losers, and the size of their loss, depends on the shape of the demand curve Assume it looks like Fig. 2 In the absence of fees, the highway ~s m eqmhbrmm at Q~ with a $0 fee A fee of P2, say 5 cents per mile, suffices to reduce usage and move the equilibrium to Q2. The drivers who leave lose little utility (area Q~AQ:) because they have low value of tame or excellent alternatwes-perhaps the local road network is good, or the freeway leg of then. trip was short, or perhaps they suffer only a small inconvenience from postponing the trip to a later hour. Almost all those drwers who remain gain a great deal of utdlty (as explmned in the next section). Under these circumstances, few will protest and many will support the toll. Pohtical acceptabdlty ~s likely But suppose the demand curves look hke Fig 3 We need a high fee, say 15 cents per mile, to remove enough drivers. Those who are pushed off lose a substantial amount of consumer surplus, area Qv4Q~. The large loss makes them likely to protest strongly, show up at hearings, write letters, etc Now consider the drivers who remain. They have lost a substantial amount of utlhty: The user fees seem to wipe out most of the benefit associated w~th the higher travel speed. (For the moment, assume these motorists do not place much value on those things for which the user fees are to be spent. The basis for then" subjective reaction is discussed later )
Who wms, who whmesL
et's look more closely at the ratio of winners to losers after user fees are imposed on a road. In Fig 4, all drivers who wish to use the road have been ranked, with the driver willing to pay the most, Jim, on the extreme left; Dan and Ed do not value 55 mph as much. We impose a user fee, P2, to force some drivers off the road. How many losers will there be? Let's enumerate them: Any driver who is priced off the road is worse off. But even some of the drivers who continue using the road will be worse off unless the government uses the fee revenues for things the dnvers value. Dan is worse off--he still uses the road but his perceived consumer surplus has been reduced (.4 < B) For Ed, and D are equal, so Ed's perceived consumer surplus is unchanged. Thus all drivers to the right of Ed may percelve that they are worse off after the fee is ~mposed, and their polmcal actions will depend on these perceptions. Suppose the government says ~t w~ll use the fee revenues to reduce general taxes How will this promise be perceived? Consider a driver who ~s forced off the freeway Twice a day he passes that freeway and Is reminded that he cannot afford it anymore. But only once a year, at income tax t~me, does he benefit from the lower tax Furthermore, the tax reduction will be small and hence hard to perceive ($250 per year from a $1 dollar daily fee). The driver may even be skepUcal that there was any tax reduction at all since he knows that such promises are often Just poht~cal talk.
That is, the cost to those who are priced off the road ~s direct, lmmed~ate and rubbed m twice a day. The benefits are at best redirect, distant and diffuse-considering them to be mere pohtical rhetoric, drivers may disregard them enurely. (The perception problem is discussed in Button, 1984 .) There used to be O~ users, so all the drivers between Ed and Q~ are likely to perceive themselves as worse off than they were before Even if this were only 25% of the former users, that ~s a lot of potenual protestors, probably enough to stop road pricing on th~s particular road. In this case, there ~s political trouble because of the high proportion of losers. It is also possible to encounter strong pollucal opposlUon w~th only a few losers if the loss of ut~hty per driver is h~gh. Consider those drivers who are priced off (those between Q) and Q2): Since their loss of consumer surplus, Q~Q:X, large, they are likely to be very determined opponents of road pricing.
In conclusion, the right-hand end of the demand curve ~s criUcal to determimng the ratio of winners to losers and the intensity of their feehngs, and hence the political acceptability of road pricing In the next section I show that the data generated by the toll road experiments will only tell us about the shape at the left-hand side of the demand curve. That is, they will not tell us what we need to know.
THE DEMAND CURVE FOR A PARALLEL TOLL ROAD
A number of places around the U.S. are building toll roads to supplement an existing congested h~ghway system. Is ~t possible to use these toll roads as a natural experiment to test the efficacy and polmcal acceptability of road pricing? Th~s secuon shows that such data will not provide the information we need: No driver will be priced off the existing road, so we will learn nothing about the willingness to leave (the shape of the right-hand end of the demand curve). Instead the toll roads will lure away those existing users who Number of people who wish to travel at the given speed Dlversmn of drivers between free-road and toll-road highly value speed (the ones on the left-hand end). Fohtlcal feasibdlty depends on the shape of the right-hand portion of the demand curve, the roll road data only trace out the shape of the left-hand end of the curve. Conslder a typical toll road experiment. A new highway (or a new lane) will be bmlt parallel to the existing free road. The drwer's declslon becomes, "Shall I continue to use the exastmg free road, or shall I switch to the new road and pay extra to go faster 9'' Imagine a driver located at point (22 m F~g. 2 The value assoclated with going 55 mph is C. How much will he pay for the privilege of using the 55-mph road 9 The answer is not Pz because his improvement m utility xs not C, ~t is only C -A: He already recewes A amount of utility from the 25-mph free road. 1 Ad&tmnally, consider the individual at the extreme left-hand slde of the demand curve If he swltches to the toll road, his utility increases by F -D, so that is the maximum price he would pay Figure 5 shows curves that describe the demand for 55-mph travel on the new toil road. These curves determine the switching dec~smn: stay put or move to the toil road? The top curve Uss -U2s shows the utlhty assocmted with moving between the existing 25-mph road and the new 55-mph toll road. Us5 -U,~ is the result of subtracting the 25-mph demand curve m Fig. 2 from the 55-mph demand curve. That Is, point G m Fig.  5 is equal to the quantity F -D m Fig. 2 ; and point J is equal to the quantity C -A. (We have also drawn in the demand curve that describes the declsmn for swltchmg between a 40-mph highway and 55-mph highway" Point H m Fig. 4 is equal to the quantity F -E m Fig. 2 ; point Ils equal to C -B.)
Suppose we set the fee on the new toll road at PI m Fig. 5 Inmally, 100 drivers will be diverted from the free road to the toll road. But if 100 drwers leave the free road, Its congestmn' drops and its average speed uses to 40 mph. Toll road users will nouce that they are only getting a 15-mph speed advantage over the old road instead of the 30-mph speed advantage they paid for. Curve Uss -U4o shows what they are willing to pay for a 15-mph increase. In fact, the toll that will d~vert 100 users Is P2: At that price, 100 users will leave the free road to travel at 55 mph on the toll road; the remaining users of the free road will increase their speed to 40 mph.
Two things are notable about this result: First, the users who switch to the new road are from the left-hand end of the demand curve (assuming the curves converge monotonically), hence the toll road experiment will trace out the shape of the left-hand end of the curve-which is not the data we need.
Jln the toll road case, he compares the move to the free alternative (stay put on the 25-mph road) and acts in terms of the difference In the road-pricing case, the 25-mph road is not aa alternatwe because a user fee was p~ac~l on It He pays the new fee or gets off Second, toll road customers are not paying for absolute speed, they are paying for relattve speed. Even though the toll road has the capaclty to handle more cars, it must not do so lest the free road speed up too much. Tolls must be set so high that only a few of the current old road users are interested m switching. The toll road will operate well below its capacltyo Thus, almost all drivers will stall be mired in traffic on the free road, staring at an essentially empty toll road whose price is set at prohxbltlve levels. They are stuck while the solution to their problem, the parallel road, remains empty and priced out of reach. This outcome seems certain to produce pubhc anger. (Suppose we build one-lane toll road to reheve congestion on a parallel four-lane free road As an approximatron, removing 100 cars per hour from a 25-mph congested lane will increase its speed to 40 mph, so the four no-fee lanes can contribute a total of only 400 cars to the toll road. This is much less than the capacity of the toll road But if the authorities lower the toll, to allow more users to afford the toll road, they will decongest the unpriced lanes and the toll road wllI no longer have a speed advantage to sell.)
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM A TOLL ROAD EXPERIMENT
Even though they cannot evaluate the poht:cal feasibility of road pricing, toll road experiments are still well worth pursuing They can test pubhc response to time-of-day pricing They can test, and debug, the automatic vehacle tdent~ficatmn and b~Iling system. And they are a useful step m educating the pubhc to the notmn that road use is not necessardy free.
Usmg a fixed toll to evaluate vartable prtcmg
Economists envlsmn different prices throughout the day h~gh at peak periods and low when congestmn is less severe How wall the pubhc react to the price varmbfl~ty? Will drivers be walling to make the necessary decismn each time they begin a new journey: "Given the d~fference in dollar costs and congestlon levels between the free network and l'he tolled network, which should I use?" At first glance, data from many of the proposed toll road experxments do not seem aseful for evaluating this questmn since many of the proposed toll roads will have a fixed price throughout the day However, these data can be used to evaluate motorists' reacirons to t~me-of-day pricing To see this, perform a simple thought experiment.
Imagine a congested freeway that runs north and south, and an uncongested toll road that parallels it And ~magme a driver at the south end of these roads, considenng whether to use the toll road or the freeway. She makes her choice by balancing the toll against the time difference between the alternauves. She will happdy pay the toll to save, say, 20 minutes; but she chooses the freeway when the t~me saving falls to only five minutes. It ~s the cost per minute of saved t~me that determines her decision, not the absolute size of the toil. As the relatlve congestmn between the two roads varies over the day, the cost per saved minute will vary as well, even though the toll Is fixed. Under lime-of-day pricing, the cost per saved minute vanes as a functmn of both relatlve congestion and the varmble toll In the toll road experiments, only one of these will vary, but for analytic purposes the situation ~s identical.
'.i.2. Testing the bdhng and automattc vehicle Mentlficatton systems
The startup period for new technologies is likely to produce problems (e.g. the early experience with the fare card system on the Washington Metro, the automatic train control system on the Bay Area Rap~d Transit system, the door actuatmn system on the Boeing Lght Rad Vehicle m Boston and so on). It seems likely that the startup period for the new automatic vehlcle ldent~ficatmn (AVI) system, and the automated billing system that are to be used by the toll roads, will produce problems too. So the chance for a real~sUc test is a valuable opportumty, since both these technologies are vital to a roadpricing scheme. We do not want to incur the danger that the concept of road pricing will be condemned because of pubhc frustration with the failures of the peripheral technologies m a "guilt by associatmn" process.
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3. The pncmg precedent
Finally, a toll road experiment can acclimate the public to the notion that road use can be priced This is especially valuable on the West Coast, where drivers have no historic experience with toll roads 6 MIGHT WE MODEL THE RIGHT-HAND END Can we model the shape of the right-hand portion of the demand curve using other known data? What would we need to know9 If a fee were imposed on an emstmg road, driver reactions would depend on two things, how much they value a minute of saved time, and the number of minutes lost if they get off the newly priced road. The interaction of these two parameters determines the response elasticity.
The first parameter, value of time, is a stable, predictable behavioral parameter that has been well studied in the literature (Hensher, 1989) . We know it is a functmn personal characteristics:
The main determinants are income and trip purpose. But the second parameter, time lost, will seem almost random m any gwen situat~on because it depends on so many other factors It varies with all the characteristics of the area, the trip and the time of day To estimate the amount of time lost, we need to know the person's ongm and destination, the average speed of the alternative routes between these points, the average speed and cost of the alternative modes and even the alternatwe ways that this trip purpose might be achieved such as chaining it to another trip or postpomng it until later. Thus, to model the right-hand end of the demand curve we require (a) a complete traffic flow model (traffic volumes and speeds for the whole road network) and (b) complete description of the trips and the drivers (the origin and destination of each rap, any desired trip chaining, the desired arrwal times and the value of time of the driver on each trip) This ~s a formidable amount of data, and it will require formidable computauons to convert it into a demand curve.
It might be possible to collect all these data and do all these analyses, but it is not likely that anyone wdl attempt such a daunting task Thus we cannot produce the mformauon we need to determine political feaslb~hty The new data generated from the toll roads are not relevant, and the old data are too expensive to collect and process
CONCLUSION
What does it mean to say we will test the concept of road pncmg? We don't need an experiment to tell us that raising the cost of some link will d~vert drivers away from it, though public officials may need convincing Rather, we need to explore the political response to pricing. How upset will drivers be when fees are imposed? What is the elasticity that relates public anger to the amount of d~sruptlon cost? This paper argues that the political response will depend on the relative numbers of losers and gainers and the amount of utility lost by those motorists who are priced off.
To depict these utlimes, I develop a new way to analyze the demand curves for a highway with a user fee. I show that the losses and gains-the political impacts-are strongly dependent on how high the pnce must be set to push enough drivers off, and this depends on the shape at the right-hand end of the demand curve But the toll road experiments revolve an increment to capacity, new roads or new lanes. So the experiments are exploring the shape at the wrong end of the demand curve.
The toll road experiments will be useful in other ways. They explore drivers' responses to variable pricing, they provide a chance to debug the billing and AVI systems that w~ll be vital to the success of a road pricing scheme and they acclimate the public to the possibility that roads might be priced. Finally, the model shows that the toll roads, themselves, are likely to produce considerable public anger when they begin to operate. The great majority of motorists on the parallel free road will still be mired in traffic, while the apparent solution to their problem, an "unfairly expensive" toll road, sits essentially empty beside them.
Jane Hall and Charles Lave
We descrxbe a measurement procedure that might be used to evaluate a road-pricing experiment The 13rocedure requires only minimal cooperation from a small group of commuters who will carry electromc sensors m their vehicles Once signed up, there Is no further mtervenuon in their lives no travel d~anes or extensive quesuonna~res This unobtrusxve measurement procedure should be attractive for other kinds of policy evaluao I~on and demonstration projects as well Our procedure is described for the case of a new road proposed to be built m Southern Cahforma, but could also (and more producuvely) be used to evaluate how tolls affect behavior when they are added to an existing road Approval has been given to build a toll road in parallel with a highly congested freeway m Orange County, Cahforma It wail be financed b> a combination of developer fees and government assistance Designated the San Joaqum Hills Corridor (SJHC), the toll road will be i5 miles long and connects to the Interstate 5 and 405 treeways (I-5 and 1-405) at its southern and northern ends Utflmng the opemng of the SJHC toll road as natural experiment, we w~ll focus on choices of drivers who llve south of the toll road mtersecuon Which drivers w~ll use the roll road, at what times of day, and for what purposesĨ n overall terms, we will follow the behavior of a sample of drivers over Ume, starting from before the new toll road ~s opened The primary observatzonal tool will be automauc vehicle ~dentff~cation (AVI) technology Each car m the sample will have an AVI plate, and there will be AVI detectors on the new toll road, the existing freeways, and the major parallel roads
To simplify the study, we will use drivers who now travel what wdl become the full length of the SJHC toll road We will identify potential candidates by a license plate study of vehicles at the north end of the SJHC/ 1-405 mtersecuon, matching these against vehicle registration mformauon to ~dentlfy those whose homes are south of the SJHC/I-5 intersection A random sample of these households will be selected and asked to participate m the study As an incentive to paruczpate, we will offer free tuneups to their vehicles (which will also allow us to do emissions momtormg of the vehicles) Paruczpants will be asked to attach an AVI plate on t ~e~r vehicles, and they will fill out a brief quesUonnalre hstmg bas~c demographic data and information about t ae~r current travel patterns
We will have AVI detectors along the I-5 and 1-405 freeways, the SJHC, the major parallel roads and m the nelghborhoods of the partmpants Starting about six months before the opemng of the toll road, we will begin collecting baseline data on current travel patterns using the AVI detectors (Although the AVI detectors do not ~dentxfy which household member is using the vehicle, the mmal questionnaire will &scorer the pnnc~pal driver of each vehicle, and previous studies have shown that the principal user of a vehicle tends to be constant )
Once the SJHC toll road xs opened, we can momtor changes m travel patterns accurately and unobtrusively We don't need dally travel diaries or further quesuonnatres Our AVI detectors will record the daaly decmons made by each driver We expect the proporuon of drivers using the toll road to vary as a funcuon of the cost per saved minute and the household charactensucs (In the mmal household interview we will ask whether commuters commonly run errands off the I-5 and/or the 1-405 The frequency of such trip chaining will affect the observed percentage of dady d~verslons onto the toll road )
Wath a momtormg period of a year, we can measure d~versmn effects With a momtonng period of two to four years, we may be able to measure any home relocauon effects as well
